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FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND FREEDOM
OF CHOICE IN NEW YORK STATE
Anthony Charles Vancet
Section 10 of the Membership Corporations Law, the basic authority
in New York for the formation of non-profit social, civic, and political
corporations, has been under attack with increasing frequency,1 but until
Matter of Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc.,,
the restraints imposed by that provision of the statute requiring judicial
approval as a prerequisite to incorporation have never been so clearly
illuminated as a definite limitation on the right to organize for purposes
not only protected by the first and fourteenth amendments, but which
are clearly necessary if intelligent representative government is to
flourish. The problems raised by that case are of far-reaching significance,
and the prospective challenge to the constitutionality of the statute arising
from the case makes timely an analysis of the implications of the case
and of section 10 generally. The purpose of this comment will be to ex-
plore some of those implications.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
The Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc., con-
sisted originally of a committee formed, as stated in its charter, "to pro-
mote the right to individual freedom of choice and association." The
group's basic premise is that all persons should have the right to choose
to associate or decline to associate with others based on ethnic or group
distinctions, as well as on other grounds, and that such right is necessary
to the fullest development of a multicultural society. The group takes no
position as to whether individuals should or should not discriminate based
on ethnic grounds in particular instances, but opposes governmental com-
pulsion in this area.3 It is probable that the Association would oppose
such legislation as a state-wide law forbidding discrimination in private
f See contributors' section, masthead, p. 306, for biographical data.
1 See generally, Dwight, "Objections to Judicial Approval of Charters of Non-Profit
Corporations," 12 Bus. Law. 454 (1957) ; Comment, "State Control over Political Organiza-
tions: First Amendment Checks on Powers of Regulation," 66 Yale LJ. 545 (1957); note,
55 Colum. L. Rev. 380 (1955).
2 17 Misc. 2d 1012, 187 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. Queens County); aff'd on rehearing, 18
Misc. 2d 534, 188 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. Queens County); application denied, 10 App.
Div. 2d 604, 199 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2d Dep't 1959); appeal denied, 10 App. Div. 2d 711,
199 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2d Dep't); petition to revoke opinions denied, 10 App. Div. 2d 873,
202 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dep't); motion to clarify order and decision of April 18, 1960
denied, 11 App. Div. 2d 713, 205 N.Y.S.2d 878 (2d Dep't); motion for consolidation of
appeals denied, 8 N.Y.2d 910, 168 N.E.2d 826, 204 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1960); appeal pending
in the Court of Appeals.
3 Matter of Ass'n for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1012, 187
N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1959).
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housing.4 There is no question raised but that the group is and intends
to carry out its program through lawful means, such as by putting out
educational material, filing briefs amicus curiae, and appearing before
legislative committees.
The group applied for judicial approval to incorporate as a New York
Membership Corporation, and on May 13, 1959, the Supreme Court,
Queens County, denied such approval based solely on the purposes set
forth in the charter.' The group's counsel then wrote the presiding justice
two letters denying the conclusions he had come to in his opinion, and
another counsel made such denials in chambers, and asked for a hearing.
The justice acceded to the request for a hearing at first, but thereafter,
upon receipt of a memorandum of law from counsel, revoked his prom-
ise,6 and on July 9, 1959, decided again to deny the approval required
by section 10 based solely on the memorandum of law.7 Subsequently,
the group was incorporated in the District of Columbia, and on October
6, 1959, the justice presiding signed orders denying the group approval
as a New York membership corporation under section 10 of the Mem-
bership Corporations Law and denying the District of Columbia cor-
poration approval to do business in New York under section 211(2) of
the General Corporation Law for the reasons stated in his opinion. These
orders are currently being appealed.
Meanwhile, to test the constitutionality of the statute on its face, the
group sent a copy of its charter to the Secretary of State with a request
that it be filed without the approval of a Supreme Court justice. The
Secretary of State refused to file it, not alone for this reason, but because
she held it to be a "hate-group corporation. ' '8 The group promptly filed a
petition under article 78 to compel her to file the charter; this too is
pending
II. APPLICABLE STATUTORY STANDARD
Section 10 of the Membership Corporations Law states that "five or
more persons may become a membership corporation for any lawful pur-
4 See Avins, "Anti-Discrimination Legislation as an Infringement on Freedom of Choice,"
6 N.Y.L.F. 13 (1960).
5 Matter of Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d
1012, 187 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1959).
6 Matter of Association For The Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc., 22 Misc. 2d
1016, 201 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960).
7 Matter of Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc., 18 Misc. 2d
534, 188 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1959).
8 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 259 (1960); N.Y. Times, February 14, 1960, p. 8, col. 5.
9 Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Simon, 22 Misc. 2d
1016, 201 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County); appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.2d 909, 204
N.Y.S.2d 150, 168 N.E.2d 826 motion for leave to dispense with printing granted; printing
dispensed with, 11 App. Div. 2d 673, 205 N.Y.S.2d 840 (2d Dep't); order denying mandamus
aff'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 927 (2d Dep't 1960); appeal pending in the Court of Appeals.
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pose." It also provides that "every certificated incorporation filed under
this chapter shall have endorsed thereon or annexed thereto the approval
of a justice of the supreme court of the judicial district in which the office
of the corporation is to be located." While this statutory provision has
been in existence since 1848,10 it was not interpreted by any appellate
court until 1921, when the Second Department declared:
It is not the province of this court in any of its departments to set itself
up as a censor of the tastes, social or political, of the people. However
repugnant to our minds and consciences the Socialist program may be, we
are not to stand in the way of organizations to promote its accomplishment,
provided only it is clear that the purpose and intent of those organizations
is to seek the accomplishment of that program by lawful methods. .... 
The above case was completely forgotten, and has not been cited by
any justice exercising his powers under section 10, even in the judicial
districts within the Second Department. Rather, shortly after the law
was amended in 1924,12 the Supreme Court, New York County, addressed
itself to the question of why the Legislature had required approval of
that court to incorporate. Reasoning in Matter of Daughters of Israel
Orphan Aid Soc'y,"3 that it could not be to check the papers for formal
defects because the Secretary of State does that anyway, the court con-
cluded by a process of elimination that it was to require "a finding that
the objects and purposes of the proposed corporation are in accord with
public policy-a determination that is more than ministerial and not a
mere duplication of the function of the Secretary of State."
Such analysis contains a basic flaw. The statute itself requires two
things: (1) That formal requirements be met, and (2) that the purposes
be lawful. The Secretary of State will attend to the first since it is a
clerical or ministerial function. The aid of the judiciary is needed, how-
ever, to interpret the charter's purposes to determine whether they are
lawful, and it seems logical to conclude that it was for this reason that
approval of a justice of the supreme court was required. Hence, the
process of elimination in Matter of Daughters of Israel Orphan Aid Soc'y,
appears to be an unwarranted graft of a new requirement on to the
statutory scheme.
The court, moreover, in effect read into the New York statute the
Pennsylvania requirement that the trial court find that the corporation's
purposes are "not injurious to the community" 4 by citing with approval
10 Section 10 was originally derived from N.Y. Sess. Laws 1848, ch. 319, § 1.
11 Matter of Lithuanian Worker's Literature Soc'y, 196 App. Div. 262, 265, 187 N.Y.
Supp. 612, 614 (2d Dep't 1921).
12 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1924, ch. 519, § 2.
13 125 Misc. 217, 219, 210 N.Y. Supp. 541, 543 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1925).
14 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2851-207 (Purdon 1958).
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a passage to that effect from In re Deutsch-Amerikanischer Volksjest-
Verein.1 The court, in so doing, ignored the language of that case that
"the requirements fixed by law can neither be dispensed with nor added
to." (Emphasis supplied.)
There are a number of unlawful purposes for which approval may be
denied, but in each case where this has occurred the activity involved
would be unlawful if done by individuals or unincorporated groups. Thus,
a charter to engage in the teaching or advocacy of violent overthrow of
the government is properly disapproved, 6 but this is a crime whether
committed singly or in concert.'7 The fraudulent palming off of one cor-
poration as another is unlawful,' 8 but unincorporated groups may equally
be enjoined from such deception.' 9 A proposed charter to establish nudist
colonies in Ohio was disapproved,2" but nudism in Ohio violates its penal
code with or without a corporate veil.21
The court here specifically absolved the Association for the Preserva-
tion of Freedom of Choice of any unlawful purpose. It held that "the
sponsors of the proposed membership corporation are completely free to
associate for the purposes they spelled out in the proposed certificate.
They are also free to speak out in support of racial and religious dis-
crimination. 22 It would seem that after such a finding, the court would
be required to approve the certificate under a proper construction of
section 10.
However, the error in Daughters of Israel Orphan Aid Soc'y has
spawned hideous judicial progeny, as decision after decision has cited it
for the proposition that the justice is in effect at liberty to grant or deny
applications based on his personal notion of what is good for the com-
munity.23 For example, one justice denied an application because whether
the method of taxation the corporation would advocate would be "equi-
table" was "a matter of speculation. ' 24 Another was disapproved because
the justice thought the corporation ought to be named after an Amer-
ican.25 Still another was disapproved because the justice thought an
15 200 Pa. 143, 49 At. 949 (1901).
16 Matter of Lithuanian Worker's Literature Soc'y, supra note 11.
17 54 Stat. 670, 671 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958).
18 Matter of General Von Steuben Bund, Inc., 159 Misc. 231, 287 N.Y. Supp. 527 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1936). See also Most Worshipful W.S.G.LA.FA. Colored Masons v. Most
Worshipful P.N.G.L.F.A. Masons, 160 Pa. Super. 595, 52 A.2d 333 (1947).
19 See Mele v. Ryder, 8 App. Div. 2d 390, 188 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1st Dep't 1959), and cases
cited therein.
20 State ex rel. Church v. Brown, 165 Ohio St. 31, 133 N.E.2d 333 (1956).
21 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.31 (Page 1954).
22 18 Misc. 2d at 535, 18& N.Y.S.2d at 887.
23 For a full parade of the "horribles," see note, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 380 (1955).
24 Matter of Council for Small Business, Inc., 155 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1956).
25 Matter of Mazzini Cultural Center, Inc., 185 Misc. 1031, 58 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1945).
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Italian-American cultural association should not be confined to the transit
system2 6 And in another case, a justice feared bloc voting.T
Indeed, personal notions of public policy have so far crept into this
area of the law that in one case two justices disagreed on the same clause
of a charter. In Matter of Patriotic Citizenship Ass'n,2 one justice,
while not agreeing that a certain constitutional amendment sought by the
sponsors would be a good one, declared that such proposal would not be
ground for disapproval. Several months later, another justice nonetheless
disapproved the charter for this reason. 9
Approval of charters are being granted on the same basis. For ex-
ample, in Matter of Committee for the Preservation of the Constitutional
Right to Trial by Jury,30 it is clear that the justice who signed the cer-
tificate there was so enthusiastically in agreement with the incorporators
that one would have had good cause to hesitate long indeed before sub-
mitting a certificate for a committee to abolish trial by jury to him al-
though many judges have recommended this step and such a purpose
would be equally lawful. Thus, a careful lawyer advising a group of in-
corporators as to the law could in truth suggest only that they study the
political, economic, social, religious, and other background of all the
justices of the supreme court in the county, select the one most likely to
be in personal agreement with the corporation's purposes, watch until he
is sitting in special term, and then present the certificate for approval,
keeping their fingers crossed that by reason of illness, press of judicial
business, etc., he is not transferred to another part. Such a game of judi-
cial "Russian roulette" mocks the concept that we have a government of
laws and not of men. As Judge Learned Hand observed:
For a judge to serve as a communal mentor appears to me to be a very
dubious addition to his duties and one apt to interfere with their proper
discharge....
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not.31
III. UTILITY OF INCORPORATING DISSENTERS UNDER SECTION 10
Professor McKay of New York University Law School has suggested
that although he disagrees with the refusal to grant a charter to the APFC
because freedom of association is "short-changed," nonetheless he seems
26 Matter of Columbian Ass'n of New York City Transit Sys., 175 Misc. 876, 24 N.Y.S.
2d 901 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1940).
27 Matter of Voters Alliance for Ams. of German Ancestry, Inc., 64 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1946).
28 52 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1944).
29 Matter of Patriotic Citizenship Ass'n, Inc., 53 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1945).
30 1 Misc. 2d 548, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1956).
31 Hand, The Bill of Rights 71, 73 (1958).
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to believe that "this organization may have little to contribute, and most
of that purely negative." 2 Assuming arguendo that a proper standard for
the formation of a membership corporation is that it "comport with
wholesome public policy, 3 3 nonetheless "dissenting" organizations such
as the APFC should be chartered as coming within this standard.
There is no question but that the court read its personal notions of
public policy into section 10 in rejecting the APFC's charter. For ex-
ample, it declared that "the court believes it is fully possible to . . .
cherish ethnic differences and contributions" while at the same time
banning institutions or practices which maintain any ethnic distinctions.
Likewise, it apparently rejected the notion that reasonable people could
even differ on the desirability of anti-discrimination legislation in any
particular situation. Such a position is certainly a most extreme one.3 4
However, a submission under section 10 should not be equivalent to
giving the justice a membership blank. In such a proceeding there are no
second-class political ideals or second-class organizations. "All litigants
'look alike' here."35 As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared:
It may be immediately observed that whether the court, because of
personal predilection on the subject, does not wish it to appear that it
approves of the purposes of the corporation is beside the point.36
The Queens County Supreme Court analogized the APFC to an or-
ganization established to urge repeal of the laws against bigamy, and
said that since such an organization could not be incorporated, neither
could the APFC. This parallel is illuminating. Bigamy is even more
clearly against public policy than discrimination.37 Yet, for that matter
every statute of the state is an expression of public policy from the most
important to the most inconsequential. Were the court's reasoning fol-
lowed, no one could ever incorporate to urge repeal or amendment of any
statute, however desirable this might be. People who wished to keep
statutes on the books could incorporate while those who advocate change
32 McKay, "Constitutional Law," 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1359, 1361 (1959); cf. Green, "The
Right to Communicate," 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 903, 924, n.75 (1960).
33 Matter of Stillwel Political Club, 109 N.Y.S.2d 331, 333 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1951); In re Good Thief Foundation, 47 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (Sup. Ct. Essex County 1944).
34 See Brief for petitioner, pp. 13-14, Matter of Ass'n for the Preservation of Freedom
of Choice, Inc., 10 App. Div. 2d 604, 199 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2d Dep't 1959).
35 Conley v. Daughters of the Republic, 106 Tex. 80, 91, 156 S.W. 197, 201 (1913).
36 Application of Conversion Center, 388 Pa. 239, 243, 130 A.2d 107, 109 (1957). See
also Application of N.Y. Soul Clinic, 208 Misc. 612, 614, 144 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1955) ; "[T]here is intended no approval (or disapproval) of any particular
religion or church, no commendation (or lack of it) as to any specific theology." Cf.
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting).
37 All forms of bigamy are made felony. N.Y. Pen. Law § 340. However, not all forms
of ethnic discrimination are prohibited, and such types that are carry only liability for
damages as the penalty for violation. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 18d, 41.
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would be relegated to unincorporated groups. Surely, section 10 was not
enacted as the guardian of the status quo. And if the analogy has any
other meaning, it is that some ideas are more equal than others, and may
be specially favored to enjoy the protection of protagonists in corporate
armor. Surely this is the very quintessence of the "indiscriminate im-
position of inequalities" which the court so loudly decries.
While the practice of bigamy is criminal, advocacy of repeal of the
laws forbidding it is lawful, 38 and however inconsistent bigamy may be
with modern sociology, psychology, or western religious beliefs, no harm
would befall the community by having a corporation engaged in attempt-
ing to spread the notion that laws against bigamy should be repealed.
Modern democratic society provides its own checks against erroneous
ideas more effective than any "censor of the tastes, social or political, of
the people." As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has declared:
Not only is a citizen of this country entitled to the free expression of
his religious beliefs, but he may by peaceful persuasion endeavor to con-
vert others thereto, and we are aware of no bar to individuals organizing
to effectuate their guaranteed rights in this regard .... Government may
not interfere with organized or individual expression of belief or disbelief.
Propogation of belief ... is protected. 39
Queens Supreme Court here postulated that when "ideas seem counter
to the mores or policies of our laws" propagation of such ideas is harmful
to the community. It seems doubtful that the APFC's ideas can be so
characterized, but assuming arguendo that the premise is sound, the con-
clusion surely does not follow. Laws are constantly being enacted and
repealed; agitation for either is a normal function of an enlightened
citizenry in a representative government and is in no sense harmful to
the community. As for what it would be desirable to agitate for, the
United States Supreme Court has declared:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp
differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest
error to his neighbor.40
The instant situation illustrates clearly the desirability of incorporating
"dissenting organizations." Ideas, to be effective, must be intelligently
developed, carefully documented, and capably presented. In this modern
38 Cf. State ex rel. Church v. Brown, 165 Ohio St. 31, 33, 133 N.E.2d 333, 335 (1956);
"The merits of nudism as a doctrine of life need not be considered in deciding this case."
See also Application for Amendment of Certificate of Incorporation of Saints of God in
Christ, Inc., 194 N.Y.S.2d 339, 340 (1959): "A determination to grant or deny 'consent
and approbation' does not and cannot indicate approval or disapproval of the religious
beliefs of the group involved."
39 Application of Conversion Center, 388 Pa. 239, 130 A.2d 107, 110 (1957).
40 Cantweli v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940), quoted with approval in Applica-
tion of Conversion Center, supra note 36, at 110-11.
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day and age, only an organization which makes this its function is capable
of so doing. The voice of the individual, whatever his resources and
ability, is lost in so vast a republic.4 ' Modern conditions make the right
to speak as individuals without the right to organize a phantom right.
It is reasonable to assume that the APFC will oppose anti-discrimina-
tion legislation in private housing.4" In so doing, it will be alone in repre-
senting a substantial segment of New York opinion. It is a well known
fact that New York State harbors a proliferation of membership corpora-
tions supporting anti-discrimination legislation. 3  They are well fi-
nanced,44 and so able to flood periodicals, other media of communication,
and courts with amicus curiae briefs, that they almost trip over each
other's feet.45 One justice even intimated that there were so many such
organizations in New York that another should not be chartered for fear
of duplication.46 The absence of organizations on the other side is note-
worthy. It results in a complete stifling of the competition of ideas.
Nor can it be said that such absence indicates a uniformity of agree-
inent as to the desirability of anti-discrimination legislation. When the
Sharkey-Isaacs-Brown Law was first proposed,47 the New York Times
opposed it in spite of the fact that "for years this newspaper has dedicated
itself to opposing bigotry" because it opposed the bill's "method of com-
pulsion. ' 4' The Wall Street Journal attacked the law as violative of rights
"absolutely fundamental to the common law and the political philosophy
on which this country was founded."4 9 There were other demonstrations
of widespread public hostility,50 and when the bill was voted on, one
41 Robison, "Protection of Associations from Compulsory Disclosure of Membership,"
58 Colum. L. Rev. 614, 620 (1958).
42 See Avins, "Anti-Discrimination Legislation as an Infringement on Freedom of
Choice," 6 N.Y.L.F. 13 (1960).
43 In the N.Y. Times, March 19, 1959, p. 65, col. 7, it is stated:
Ninety organizations in the state sent a joint telegram yesterday to Governor
Rockefeller and legislative leaders calling for enactment of the Metcalf-Baker . ..
bill . . . [outlawing] discrimination in the sale and rental of most private housing
in this state. It is similar to the Sharkey-Isaacs-Brown law.
It is significant that the article mentions no organizations as having sent a telegram in
opposition. Cf. American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 19 Misc. 2d 205, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218,
222 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959).
44 For example, the Commission on Race and Housing recently obtained $305,000 from
the Fund for the Republic to conduct some studies on integrated housing. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 21, 1960, p. 58, col. 3; id., Feb. 29, 1960, p. 29, col. 1.
45 See Vose, "NAACP Strategy in the Covenant Cases," 6 W. Res. L. Rev. 101, 133-38,
141-43 (1955).
40 Application of Knesseth Harabanium, Inc., 131 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1954).
47 Now New York City Local Law No. 80 (1957), New York City Administrative Code
ch. 41, tit. X, §§ X 41-1.0 (1957).
48 Editorial, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1957.
49 Editorial, Wall Street Journal, July 29, 1957.
Go See N.Y. Times, July 31, 1957, p. 1, col. 2. In the N.Y. Times, June 19, 1957, p. 1,
col. 1 & p. 24, col. 2, it was reported that: "Another factor was the trend in the heavy
mail that has been pouring into City Hall since the bill was introduced May 21, Mayor
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councilman opposed it and two pointedly abstained.5' Similar opposition
has arisen to a proposed state-wide law on the same subject.52
The real reason why no effective organization has heretofore arisen to
challenge anti-discrimination legislation is the name-calling which would
almost certainly be levied at its members. The court's characterizations
of the APFC and its members in this case constitute a graphic illustration
of the risk of defamation run by opponents of such laws. That a group of
responsible individuals can be found who are willing to so jeopardize
their reputations for their beliefs should be an occasion for celebration
regardless of where one stands on this issue, and not a signal for judicial
name-calling. The APFC's role of constructive opponent to such laws
should make its operation of value to legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of government alike. 3 True competition of ideas is the only
sure road to sound public policy.
IV. JUDICIAL BIAs IN DETERMINING WHETHER CORPORATION AccoRDs
WITH PUBLIC POLICY
One of the problems endemic to judicial findings under section 10 is
the 'necessity of assuring that the justice to whom a certificate is sub-
mitted does not have such strong feelings against the purposes of the
proposed corporation that his whole view of their activities becomes a
jaundiced and distorted reflection of an intense personal antipathy. This
possibility is a very real one when the justice's only guide is a vague
standard of "wholesome public policy." No better illustration can be
found than that which occurred in this very case, where charges and
countercharges of bias have been leveled by both justice and attorney.54
I will attempt to sift those attacks to determine the extent to which they
may be valid.
The justice presiding in this case called the proposed corporation a
"hate-group," and charged that the individual incorporators were "prej-
Wagner's office reported 3,300 pieces of mail to date opposed and 1,000 in favor. Some
councilmen said their mail was running 4 to 1 opposed."
51 N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1957, p. 1, col. 4.
52 See N.Y. Times, March 9, 1960, p. 23, col. 1, where the Chairman of the New York
State Senate Finance Committee stated: "This bill would take away the last vestige of
right from the private citizen to do what he wants with his own land. There are still a
few people who feel that they have a right to do with their own property what they see
fit."
53 State Senator George R. Metcalf, coauthor of the Metcalf-Baker Bill to forbid dis-
crimination in private housing, wrote to the APFC General Counsel on March 7, 1960, as
follows: "I agree with the sentiments expressed in your letter of March 2nd, namely that
opponents of the proposed fair housing legislation should have an opportunity to be heard
in a public forum."
54 17 Misc. 2d at 1013, 1014, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 707, 709, aff'd on rehearing, 18 Misc. 2d at
538, 539, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 889, 890. In the APFC's brief before the Appellate Division supra
note 34, at pp. 22-27, the group charged the justice presiding with bias. See also Avins,
supra note 41, at 28, n.62.
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udiced and bigoted." Such charges do not appear to be supported by any
evidence.
The Association's brief to the Appellate Division identified the fol-
lowing as five major fallacies which the court was guilty of:
(1) All persons who advocate freedom of choice and association and
the right of individuals to make distinctions based on ethnic grounds do so
because they themselves desire to make such distinctions.
(2) All persons who make distinctions based on ethnic grounds neces-
sarily do so for irrational reasons and hence are bigoted.
(3) All distinctions based on ethnic grounds are necessarily irrational.
(4) All distinctions based on ethnic grounds necessarily violate the
state and federal constitutions. 55
(5) Freedom of choice and association will necessarily always result in
a choice of non-association or discrimination.
Since the court was not personally acquainted with the incorporators,
and since it did not hold a hearing on their personal views, its character-
izations were unsupported by any evidence or record. Moreover, its
epithet of "hate group" likewise lacked evidence to support it, for such
a group is one which tries to stir up hatred against a segment of the
population,56 and the APFC's purposes appear to be different.
The court's opinion shows some internal inconsistencies regar g
the statements made in the memorandum submitted to it. Thus, at te
top of one page, the court declares: "There is a state public policy against
discrimination. The memorandum of law submitted in support of the
application acknowledges this fact." At the bottom of the same page it
states: "In my opinion I stated that there is a 'public policy of our State
against discrimination because of race or creed.' The memorandum of
law submitted on behalf of the petitioners disagrees with that state-
ment.15 7 Either the memorandum agrees or disagress; but it cannot do
both. In fact, it disagreed in part, but contended that it would make
no difference.
In the first opinion, the court declared: "Organizations . . . thus re-
tarding homogeneity, should not be sanctioned.""8 In the second opinion,
after the APFC memorandum was submitted arguing the unsoundness of
this position, the court conceded "the public policy of the State of New
York does not seek to eliminate ethnic differences in our populations,"5 9
55 Cf. Reed v. Hollywood Professional School, 338 P.2d 633, 636 (Cal. App. 1959): "To
appellant's contention that any distinction or discrimination based upon race is repugnant
and void under the Constitution of the United States or of this state, this court cannot
agree."
56 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); People v. Waite Circle League of Am.,
408 Ill. 564, 97 N.E.2d 811 (1951); Brownstein v. Morris, 203 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1960); N.Y.
Times, June 23, 1960, p. 1, col. 1 (Nazi Party).
57 18 Misc. 2d at 536, 537, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
58 17 Misc. 2d at 1014, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
50 18 Misc. 2d at 536, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
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but still defended Matter of Catalonian Nationalist Club6 ° from which the
first quotation was taken. Homogeneity means that everyone is the same;
the court has declared this to be the state's public policy while acknowl-
edging that the state's policy is also to perpetuate differences. The incon-
sistent positions used to buttress the same argument lend force to the
APFC's contentions of a preconceived bias.
The court misconstrued the memorandum of law submitted to it. Thus,
to show the inapplicability of Hirabayashi v. United States,6 one of the
Japanese detention cases cited in the court's first opinion, the APFC
memorandum said "there is a vast difference between imposing martial
law on an American citizen and sending him off to detention or con-
centration camps and merely declining to rent an apartment to him." The
court read this sentence as follows: "What [the APFC's] point of
view is .... may be gleaned from their contention that there is nothing
wrong in 'merely declining to rent an apartment' to one by reason of his
race or his creed or his color." 62 In addition, the court declared that
"counsel seek to justify their intent to support racial and religious dis-
crimination, 63 while the memorandum of law stated: "The Klan did
advocate discrimination against minorities. . . . [T]he Association does
not have such an aim"; and also stated: "freedom of choice does not
necessarily lead to discrimination or distinctions based on ethnic
grounds." To repeat a denial of purpose twice should be sufficient.
The short of the matter is that the APFC has the better of the argu-
ment in the welter of charges and countercharges of bias. It is clear that
the court used preconceived ideas of its purpose and ignored everything
unfavorable to it.64
Proceedings under section 10 are susceptible to political bias. If jus-
tices are to be left free to deny incorporation on so vague a standard as
"wholesome public policy," the temptation to read one's own notions of
what public policy is or should be into the statute is well nigh irresistible.
Nothing can cause a greater divergence of opinion than what "public
policy" should be, and hence the practical effect of section 10 is to leave
incorporators at the unrestrained mercy of the particular calendar assign-
ment for that day.
True, it has been held that particular views on public questions do not
60 112 Misc. 207, 184 N.Y. Supp. 132 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1920).
61 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
62 18 Misc. 2d at 537, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
63 18 Misc. 2d at 536, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
64 Cf. People v. McLaughlin, 150 N.Y. 365, 379, 44 N.E. 1017, 1021 (1896):
That . . . courts may be unconsciously biased to the injury of one of the parties
must be admitted. Prejudice is often an insuperable barrier to the fair and impartial
administration of the law. Its influence is subtle, insidious and often unconsciously
warps the judgment and blinds the intelligence of those surrounded by its atmosphere.
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constitute disqualifying bias in an administrative proceeding, 5 but these
cases relate to administrative agencies whose standards are fixed by, and
known from, statute.66 Surely it would be an impermissible delegation of
administrative authority to provide that an agency might regulate or
forbid conduct, or issue licenses, or take other action, without setting
forth any standards to which the agency had to conform.67 Otherwise,
persons are at the mercy of the arbitrary will or whim of the agency.
If no more certain guide is to be given to a justice of the Supreme
Court than "wholesome public policy," it would seem that incorporators
should have a constitutional right, analogous to the right not to be tried
by a biased judge or jury,68 to have the application passed upon by a
justice who does not hold personal views so antagonistic to those of the
incorporators that he will be tempted to translate those views into the
public policy 9f the state. Otherwise, the basis of rejection will become,
as it has here, political, social, moral, or economic differences between
the justice and the incorporators, and the Supreme Court will truly be-
come the "censor of the tastes, social or political, of the people."
V. RIGHT TO A HEARING ON THE PURPOSES OF THE CORPORATION
As I have noted above, no hearing was granted to the APFC, but
rather the court made certain observations and drew conclusions from
the statement of purposes in its charter and a memorandum of law. The
infirmities of this procedure are patent.
Thus, the memorandum of law consisted, not of a full disclosure of
the corporation's purposes, but rather of arguments containing frag-
mentary bits which might be deemed to shed some light on its objectives.
65 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 700, 703 (1948).
68 2 Davis, Administrative Law § 12.01 (1958).
67 Carlson v. Landen, 342 U.S. 524, 542-44 (1952); A.LA. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); United
States v. Chicago, MS.P. & P.R.R., 282 U.S. 311 (1931); State v. Traffic Tel. Workers'
Fed'n, 2 NJ. 335, 353, 66 A.2d 616, 625 (1949) ; Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of
State of N.Y., 298 N.Y. 184, 189, 81 N.E.2d 80, 82 (1948). In Bologno v. O'Connell, 7
N.Y.2d 155, 159, 196 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93 (1959), it was held:
Where it is difficult or impractical for the Legislature to lay down a definite, com-
prehensive rule, a reasonable amount of discretion may be delegated to the administra-
tive officials.
However, this is obviously not to be construed as a grant of limitless authority to
provide for the health, safety, and general welfare. Administrative discretion must be
guided by an express or dearly implied standard, policy or purpose. (Emphasis omitted).
68 United States v. Peebles, 220 F.2d 114, 118, 120 (7th Cir. 1955); Pittsburg S.S. Co.
v. NLRB, 167 F.2d 126, 128 (6th Cir. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 337 U.S. 656 (1949);
NLRB v. Phelps, 136 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1943); In re Doyle, 312 Mich. 205, 20 N.W.2d
161 (1945); Ponder v. Davis, 233 N.C. 699, 706, 65 S.E.2d 356, 360 (1951). As the court
declared in NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905, 909 (6th Cir. 1940): "We may accept
as fundamental, the axiom that a trial by a biased judge is not in conformity with due
process of law." citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1926); Jordan v. Massachusetts,
225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 294
(1937).
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However, these bits were mostly concerned in this case with refuting the
first opinion, and hence the memorandum conceded a number of posi-
tions for the sake of argument only which the court seized upon as re-
flections of the corporation's purposes. Such piecing together is hardly
desirable for a proceeding where a full-dress hearing can be held.
Moreover, the court in its first opinion had nothing more before it than
the statement of purposes, yet declared that such purposes were "but a
cloak for the real purpose for which the corporation is sought to be or-
ganized." Unless the purposes show this plainly on their face--and by
characterizing them as a "cloak" and "mask" the court appears to refute
this idea-the conclusions cannot possibly in reason or logic stem from
them. Such conclusions are based on nothing more than suspicion, sur-
mise, and conjecture. To so conduct any form of legal proceeding is a
parody of due process.69
Where one court suspected that the stated purposes might have been a
"cloak" for an ulterior purpose, it requested the corporation's sponsors
to submit further affidavits.70 This procedure is undoubtedly proper, and
suffices where the affidavits disclose the lawful purposes of the corpora-
tion, and where the justice can use these affidavits as on a motion for
summary judgment to grant the charter. However, before refusal of the
charter, a full-dress hearing should be required in proceedings under
section 10. No lesser procedure can satisfy the demands of due process.71
As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared in In re Incorporation of
Philadelphia Labor's Non-Partisan League Club:72
In reviewing the court's action, the difficulty we see is that it did not
give the applicants an opportunity to be heard, even after they had filed
exceptions .... At least the applicants should have the chance to show
that those matters alleged against them are untrue or mistaken or sus-
ceptible of another interpretation....
While the application for a charter may not be subject to exactly the
69 Bridges v. Wixon, 144 F.2d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 326
U.S. 135, 156 (1945); Ellis v. Henderson, 204 F.2d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1953); United States
v. Sage, 118 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D. Neb. 1954); United States v. Everngan, 102 F. Supp. 128,
130 (S.D.W. Va. 1951); In re Schmidt, 68 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1946); United States
ex rel. Hull v. Stalter, 61 F. Supp. 732, 734 (N.D. Ind. 1945), aff'd, 151 F.2d 633, 635
(7th Cir. 1945); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Mangam, 199 Ark. 767, 770, 136 S.W.2d
158, 160 (1940); Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co., 220 Minn. 318, 19 N.W.2d 795 (1945);
People ex rel. Consol. Water Co. v. Maltbie, 275 N.Y. 357, 366, 9 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1937);
Rich Hill Coal Co. v. Bashore, 334 Pa. 449, 474, 7 A.2d 302, 314 (1939). In Dickinson v.
United States, 346 U.S. 389, 397 (1953), the court declared: "[D]ismissal of the claim
solely on the basis of suspicion and speculation is . . . foreign to our concepts of justice."
70 In re German & Austrian-Hungarian War Veterans Post No. 65, 13 N.Y.S.2d 207
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1939).
71 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33, 49 (1950); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); Republic Natl Bank v. Crip-
pen, 224 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1955); Smith v. Dental Prods. Co., 168 F.2d 516, 519 (7th
Cir. 1948); Bospect Realty Corp. v. McGoldrick, 283 App. Div. 566, 128 N.Y.S.2d 918
(1954).
72 328 Pa. 465, 196 AtI. 222 (1938).
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same rules as some other judicial proceedings, it is subject to the funda-
mental one that persons before a court shall not be condemned by a judge's
finding without being given an opportunity to be heard.7 3
As noted above, the Secretary of State rejected the APFC's demand to
file its certificate without approval of a justice of the supreme court, but
not for that reason alone. It was ruled that New York State laws were
"expressly intended to deny the right and privilege of doing business in
the State of New York to any hate-group corporation" and that "The
law of our state is not intended to aid or abet anti-Americanism under
beguiling fronts. '7 4 In reply to the APFC's demand for a hearing on the
findings as to the nature of the group, the Secretary of State declared:
"Although there are no requirements of law for such a hearing, it would
have been a useless formality to have one." 75
Of course, it is perfectly proper for the Secretary of State to reject
papers defective on their face for that reason, and had the rejection here
been because of the lack of approval required by section 10, no criticism
could have been made. An administrative official must assume the validity
of the statute under which he acts until the courts declare otherwise,7 6
and since this defect appeared on the face of the papers, a hearing thereon
would have indeed been a "useless formality." But although a valid rea-
son may exist for administrative action, when the agency acts for incor-
rect reasons, its position cannot be sustained because a correct ground
may be found.77
The Secretary of State's ruling here turned on the nature of the cor-
poration. Elementary fairness requires that when an administrative official
makes findings as to the nature of a corporation as the ground for refusing
to file its certificate, a hearing first be held to determine the facts on which
73 Id. at 468, 196 Atl. at 224.
74 N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1960, p. 8, col. 5.
7r Letter of Secretary of State to General Counsel, APFC, March 1, 1960.
76 Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539 (1958); Engineers Pub. Serv.
Co. v. SEC, 78 App. D.C. 199, 213, 138 F.2d 936, 952-3 (1943); Todd v. SEC, 137 F.2d
475, 478 (6th Cir. 1943); Panitz v. District of Columbia, 72 App. D.C. 131, 112 F.2d 39
(1940) ; 3 Davis, Administrative Law § 20.04 (1958). It might be noted that administrative
remedies need not be exhausted where constitutional issues are raised since the agency cannot
pass on them anyway. Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 625-26 (1946);
Platt v. City of New York, 196 Misc. 360, 92 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County),
rev'd on other grounds, 276 App. Div. 873, 93 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't 1949). See also
New York Post Corp. v. Kelley, 296 N.Y. 178, 71 N.E.2d 456 (1947); Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 198, 11 N.E.2d 728 (1937).
77 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947): "When the case was first here,
we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule of administrative law. That rule is to the
effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such
action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or
improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what
it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis." This was quoted with approval in
Barry v. O'Connell, 303 N.Y. 46, 50, 100 N.E.2d 127, 129 (1951).
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the ruling is predicated. 8 And since the court's conclusions were unsup-
ported, this was doubly true as to the ruling of the Secretary of State.
The need for a hearing in section 10 proceedings is especially high-
lighted by the facts of the instant case. The court and the Secretary of
State called the APFC "malevolent," "anti-American," a "hate-group,"
etc. Clearly, such epithets are defamatory, and tend to hold up the group
and its members to hatred, contempt, and ridicule. Such statements,
especially when made by judges and high public officials, would tend to
cause members to resign, deter others from joining, dry up sources of
funds, and otherwise wreck a group which is just starting. When made by
private persons, such statements would be libelous per se,79 and a non-
profit corporation could no doubt collect heavy damages for it. 0 Yet
when a justice or Secretary of State makes these statements, he is not
only immune from libel suits," but spreads a blanket of immunity of
endless elasticity over the statements, which permit them to be repeated
with immunity by anyone forever.8 2 The incalculable harm which such
defamatory statements can cause is a telling demonstration of the need
for rigid adherence to the requirements of due process in section 10
proceedings.
Moreover, an applicant enters a section 10 proceeding with a pre-
sumption that its purposes are lawful and not harmful to the community.
For this reason, no hearing is necessary if the charter is to be approved,
but only where disapproval is contemplated. Hence, the burden is on
the opponents of the charter during a hearing thereon. As one case held:
The appellant's idea seems to be that the Master should have affirma-
tively found facts which would support reasons why the granting of a
charter would not be injurious to the community. But that would be to
impose the burden of proof on the wrong party. One is not required to
negative a fact of which there is no affirmative proof either direct or
presumptive.83 (Emphasis omitted.)
78 Similarly, one who has no "right" . . . may nevertheless have a "right" to fair
treatment when state officers grant, deny, suspend, or revoke . . . licenses ...
The fundamental proposition . . . is that some kinds of unfairness are deemed
deserving of judicial relief even when they appear in a context of privileges or gratuities.
1 Davis, Administrative Law § 7.12, at 456 (1958). See also Goldsmith v. United States
Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1925); Byse "Opportunity to be Heard in License
Issuance," 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 57 (1952).
79 See Annots., 171 A.L.R. 709 (1947); 33 A.L.R.2d 1196 (1954), and cases cited therein.
80 New York Soc'y for the Suppression of Vice v. MacFadden, 260 N.Y. 167, 183 N.E.
284 (1932).
81 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); 53
C.J.S., Libel and Slander, §§ 103, 104 (1948).
82 Thayer, Legal Controls of the Press § 62, at 366 (1956) ; 53 CJ.S., Libel and Slander,
§§ 123, 124, 126, 127 (1948).
83 In re Incorporation of the Nottingham Fire Co., 394 Pa. 631, 634, 149 A.2d 119, 120
(1959).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Proceedings under section 10 of the Membership Corporations Law
have left much to be desired in terms of protection of groups not in
accord with the views of justices to whom applications were submitted.
As in the case of the Association for the Preservation of Freedom of
Choice, Inc., this section has become a vehicle for throttling unpopular
dissent from majority viewpoint. Violations of both procedural as well
as substantive due process so clearly present in the instant case are
endemic to proceedings heretofore had under this statute. It may be
predicted with some degree of assurance that unless these proceedings
are raised to conform to elementary standards of due process, the statute
itself will not survive a constitutional attack.
